Argo: Uninspired and Unsatisfying
29 MayI finally watched best picture winner Argo yesterday (I’m not the only political scientist to watch it so late after its release!). It was a competent genre film that cast a light on the heroic, but largely unsung actions of American intelligence and foreign service officers during a turbulent time in U.S foreign policy. After seeing the film, however, I did not agree with the academy’s decision to award this film the “Best Picture” at this year’s Oscars.
My major issue with this film was not its depiction of politics or international relations (despite my professional expertise), but the license taken with the real story to produce suspense. Argo is a prisoner of its genre, especially in its last 45 minutes when the audience is bombarded with a succession of (false) moments designed to add suspense to the film. By being entirely consistent with the expected tropes of this kind of film, the writers created a false climax that was “safe” for Hollywood executives and mainstream audiences, but also totally uninspired and unsatisfying.
Consider all the options to end America’s political dysfunction
10 AprDemocracies have two fundamental constitutional choices they can make about the structure of their political system: whether to use a presidential or parliamentary system of government, and whether to use a plurality or proportional electoral system. When faced with a political crisis or chronic political dysfunction, critics of the existing system often propose pursuing one of the roads not taken. Unfortunately, they often forget that there are two choices to reconsider, not one.
For example, election law expert Rick Hasen explores in a new paper whether constitutional change from a presidential system to a parliamentary form of government is necessary to address political polarization in the United States (Seth Masket and Jonathan Bernstein both have nice writeups).
Hasen starts with the proposition that :
The partisanship of our political branches and mismatch with our structure of government raise this fundamental question: Is the United States political system so broken that we should change the United States Constitution to adopt a parliamentary system either a Westminster system as in the United Kingdom or a different form of parliamentary democracy? Such a move toward unified government would allow the Democratic or Republican parties to act in a unified way to pursue a rational plan on budget reform on other issues. Voters could then hold the party in power accountable if the programs its pursued were against voter preferences. It seems a more logical way to organize politics and insure that each party will have a chance to present its platform to the voters, to have that platform enacted, and to allow voters at the next election to pass on how well the party has managed the country.
Hasen examines four arguments against making this level of constitutional change to deal with our current political dysfunction. He rejects three of them as insufficient, but finds it too soon to reject the fourth. He thus advocates a wait-in-see attitude. Unfortunately, Hasen’s analysis is only half-complete because he only considers the choice between presidentialism and parliamentarism, but he fails to consider the equally choice of electoral system beyond the vague idea of “a different form of parliamentary democracy.”
I do not have any great insights to make about Hasen’s analysis, but I would like to see more consideration of the role of electoral systems in producing and reducing party polarization. If we are going to entertain the unlikely possibility of constitutional change, let us entertain all the options.
Quote of the Day*
9 AprI am rapidly coming to the conclusion that not a single one of our major institutions, within government or without, is capable of confronting this problem. And if we can’t, that’s rather the ballgame, isn’t it?
Charles P. Pierce on the “[The Worst Thing Obama Could Say On Climate Change.”](http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/The_Wrong_Thing_To_Say?src=soc_fcbks)
* No promises that my quote of the day will not actually be from today.
H/T to Gerry Canavan
Quote of the Day*
8 AprThe United States leads the developed world in both homicide and incarceration, and both of those evils land most heavily on poor African Americans.
We can and should do better. But “doing better” doesn’t mean simply focusing on social services and systemic reforms and ignoring the need for punishment. It means using punishment intelligently, which means using it as sparingly as possible but also as much as necessary. As Machiavelli warned his fellow opponents of tyranny, a reluctance to punish comes naturally with good-heartedness, but those unable to overcome that reluctance are as unfit to rule as those who have no such reluctance to begin with.
Mark A.R. Kleiman discussing how to get “Smart on Crime” in Democracy Journal.
* No promises that my quote of the day will not actually be from today.
Some pundits were just wrong, not irrational
26 MarI agree with almost everything Kathleen Geier writes in her devastating takedown of the pundit class and their views on the Iraq War:
Pundits like to imagine that they take political positions only after a careful consideration of the merits — listening to arguments, studying position papers, weighing the pros and cons, and coming to a decision.
But politics is not necessarily so rational, and never was irrationality more plainly on display than in the months leading up to the Iraq War. Ten years later, it is worth exploring why so many opinion-makers – including those who were otherwise critical of the Bush administration — passionately advocated war.
For at least some leading pundits, their position seems to have been shaped less by “reason” or “ideas” than something more primal and even tribal, reflecting their fantasies about who they imagined themselves to be. What follows is a taxonomy of certain pundits on the center and the left who, to their eternal shame, beat the drums of war — hard.
The ICC and Libya: Contradictions in International Law Undermine ICC’s Credibility
25 AugAssuming the Gaddafi regime is finally toppled, the Libyan endgame has revealed a major contradiction in international law that undermines the credibility of the International Criminal Court. The U.N. Security Council’s Resolution (UNSC 1970) referring Libya’s case to the ICC seems to obligate a new Libyan government to hand Gaddafi over to the Court. However, the Court’s own statues (and UNSC 1970) make it very clear that states not party to the Rome Statute have no obligation under the Statute. This includes Libya. The Rome Statute also only grants the ICC jurisdiction when domestic courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute under a standard called complementarity.
International actors have tried to resolve this contradiction in several ways. The United States has taken the position that a new Libyan government can decide where and how to try Gaddafi. The ICC has resolved the contradiction differently, declaring that Libya must turn Gaddafi over to them per UNSC 1970, but then ICC judges will have to determine whether or not the Court has jurisdiction under complementarity. While this would have the advantage of giving the Court some much needed credibility, the ICC has no jurisdiction to resolve the contradiction because the source is a body of law outside its purview. As a result, this contradiction in international law threatens to undermine the Court’s credibility.
As Julian Ku has pointed out, Libya’s obligation to turn Gaddafi over to the ICC actually depends on how you interpret the UN Charter not the Rome Statue. Article 41 of the UN Charter says:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
It is certainly not clear from Article 41 whether or not surrendering a war criminal to an international court is something the Security Council can order a sovereign state to do. If it can, then Libya is obligated as a UN member to hand Gaddafi over to the ICC as the ICC claims. If not, then Libya has no obligation to the ICC. Unfortunately, the UN Charter does not provide for one authoritative interpreting body to resolve questions of interpretation. Instead, it is subject to multiple levels of interpreters whose interpretations are not binding on each other. The most likely, and arguable most appropriate, venue for resolving the contradiction is the Security Council itself.
The Hedgeblog 